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In a differentiated triopoly model with heterogeneous firms, the local stability of the Nash equilibrium under 
both quantity and price competition is analyzed. We find that the presence of a firm following a gradient rule 
based on marginal profits, and a player with adaptive expectations, determines the local stability of the Nash 
equilibrium, regardless the competition type, while the effects of the degree of product differentiation on the 
stability depend on the nature of products. Moreover, the Nash equilibrium is more stable under quantity 
competition than under price competition. 
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Two classical models in the theory of oligopoly are those of Cournot [13] and Bertrand [7]. In Cournot’s 
model the firms choose to compete on output quantity, and in Bertrand’s model they choose to compete on 
price. Both models can be interpreted as static games where decisions are made simultaneously and where 
each firm maximizes its own profit, in a context of perfect and complete information1.  
However, there is a growing interest in analyzing Cournot and Bertrand competition in a dynamic setting.  
Assuming the discrete time scale, the properties of the resulting dynamic process are given by the way that the 
firms adjust their quantity or price levels that, in turn, depends on the formation of their expectations. 
The naïve, or Cournot, expectations assume that firms use the latest available information. Thus, each firm 
expects its rivals to offer the same quantity or price in the current period as they did in the previous period and 
there is no retaliation. In this setting, it is concluded that for the duopoly case, the equilibrium is globally 
stable as it is deduced in the static context. However, under this expectation rule, in a seminal paper, 
Theocharis [24] showed that in a Cournot oligopoly with linear demand function and constant marginal costs, 
an increasing in the number of competitors plays a destabilizing role. Particularly, if the number of firms is 
higher than three, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium becomes unstable. This paradoxical result has been 
generalized by varying different assumptions, for example, by considering different shapes of the demand 
function (see [4], [21]), of the cost function [19], or both [28]. 
The burgeoning interest in nonlinear dynamic oligopolies has renewed the use of decisional mechanism. In 
this line, more realistic expectation rules than naïve expectations have been proposed. It is the case of gradient 
rule based on marginal profits (see [8], [23], [5]), and the adaptive expectations principle [9].  
In the literature, most papers focus on games with homogeneous players, that is, firms that adopt the same 
expectation rule. However, it may be more realistic to assume that firms have heterogeneous expectations.  
Belonging to this group, we can cite [1], [2], and [26], who analyzed a duopoly model with homogeneous 
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product, and assuming heterogeneous expectations. More recently, Fanti and Gori [16] analyze the dynamics 
of a horizontally2 differentiated duopoly under Cournot competition, with heterogeneous players. 
The analysis of oligopolies with more than two firms has been less addressed in the literature. In this line, 
[20], [3], and [11] are examples of homogeneous triopolies. The research on dynamics in games with more 
than two heterogeneous players is still poor. As exceptions, we can cite Elsadany et al [15], who consider an 
oligopoly game with four heterogeneous firms producing perfect substitute goods, and show that the stability 
of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium depends on the speed of adjustment of the gradient firm, and the player with 
adaptive expectations has a stabilizing effect on the game. On the other hand, in an oligopoly model with 
isoelastic inverse demand function and constant marginal costs, Tramontana et al [27] show that the stability 
region on the parametric space may enlarge by increasing the number of heterogeneous competitors.  
The case of three heterogeneous firms producing differentiated goods is considered by Andaluz and Jarne [6]. 
These authors study a linear dynamic system of a differentiated triopoly under quantity and price competition, 
and assuming that two firms follow a gradient rule based on marginal profits and a firm revises its beliefs 
according to naïve expectations.  It is showed that in the presence of both complement and substitute goods, 
the stability of the Nash equilibrium increases when goods tend to be independents. Moreover, the Nash 
equilibrium is more stable under quantity competition than under price competition. 
The present article constitutes an extension of the model proposed by [6]. Firstly, we analyze the local 
stability of the Nash equilibrium, under both quantity and price competition, but assuming a nonlinear 
dynamic system of a differentiated triopoly. Secondly, we introduce more heterogeneity among players. Thus, 
we assume gradient rule, naïve expectations, and adaptive expectations hypothesis for the three firms 
competing in the market, respectively. 
We conclude that there is a critical value of the adjustment speed of the gradient player, for which the Nash 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
1 Otherwise, the Cournot and Bertrand models can be interpreted as conjectural variation models (see [10]). In Cournot’s original model, each firm’s conjecture 
is that the other firms are satisfied to continue selling their current quantity of output. However, from a purely game-theory perspective, the conjectural variations 
approach is theoretically unsatisfactory (see [25]). 




equilibrium loses its stability. This threshold is higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand 
competition, and therefore, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is more stable than the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, 
regardless of the nature of products.  
On the other hand, both under Bertrand and Cournot competition, it is deduced that, in the presence of 
complement goods, a lower degree of product differentiation (goods tend to be independent) stabilizes the 
Nash equilibrium. By contrast, assuming substitutes goods, there exists a level of product differentiation that 
ensures the maximal stability of the Nash equilibrium.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model that is developed for this 
study.  Section 3 develops the dynamics under Cournot competition. The dynamics under price competition is 
analyzed in Section 4.  Section 5 closes the paper with the main conclusions. 
 
2. The model 
We extend the model formulated by [22] for the triopoly case. Specifically, we consider an economy with a 
monopolistic sector of three firms, each producing a differentiated good, and a competitive numeraire sector. 
There is a continuum of identical consumers with a utility function separable and linear in the numeraire 
good.   
Denoting as qi the quantity of good i, and pi its price, the representative consumer maximizes the following 
utility function with respect to the quantities:   
3
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Function 
1 2 3( , , )u q q q is assumed to be quadratic and must be strictly concave. Particularly, we adopt the 
following specification: 
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d− < < , in order to ensure the strict concavity of (2) . 
Maximizing (1), given (2), we deduce the inverse demand in the region of quantities where prices are 
positive:  
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From (4), it is deduced that, when d = 0, goods are independent and each firm is monopolist in the market for 




d− < < , goods are complements, and if instead 0 < d < 1, goods are substitutes, being 
perfect substitutes for the limit case d = 1. 
Firms have identical and constant marginal costs, c > 0. Therefore, the profits of firm i are given by 
( )i i ip c qΠ = − , i = 1, 2, 3. 
 
3. Dynamics under Cournot competition  
We consider a dynamic triopoly where firms compete on quantity. In this setting, the quantity demanded to 
each firm is given by (3) and the profit function of firm i is: 
3
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  (6) 
We consider a heterogeneous triopoly game in the sense that triopolists adopt different mechanisms to decide 
the output of each time period. We assume firm 1 follows a gradient rule based on marginal profits, firm 2 
follows the best reply with naïve expectations, while firm 3 follows the best reply under an adaptive 
expectations scheme (henceforth, we call them gradient firm, naïve firm, and adaptive firm, respectively). 
Thus, the first firm increases or decreases the quantity of output that it produces at time t+1 depending on 
whether current marginal profits are either positive or negative3. That is, the output adjustment mechanism 
over time of the first firm is given by: 
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3( ) ( 2 ( ))
t t t t t t t t tq q q q q a c q d q qα α+ = + Φ = + − − − +   (7) 
where 1 1( ) ,
t tq qα α= being α  > 0 a parameter that captures firm 1’s adjustment speed whit respect to a 
marginal change in profits. 
The second firm is a naïve player which solves the following optimization problem: 
2
1 , 1 , 1
2 2 1 2 3arg max ( , , )
+ + += Πt e t t e t
q
q q q q  (8) 






t a c d q qq +
− − +=   (9) 
Finally, we suppose that firm 3 is an adaptive player. Hence, the third firm changes its output proportionally 
to the difference between the best reply with naïve expectations and the last period’s output quantity. Then, 
the firm 3’s decision mechanism is a partial adjustment towards the best response with naïve expectations, 




(1 ) , 0 1
2
t t
t t a c d q q
q qβ β β+ − − += − + < <   (10) 
 
3 In the literature, this adjustment rule is usually called  bounded rationality (see, among others, [26]) or "myopic" (see [14]) 
 
7 
The parameter β measures how reluctant the adaptive player is to change its previous period choice following 
the suggestion given by the reaction function. If  β = 0, the output level would never change, and if β = 1, it 
would be the best response with naïve expectations. 
Using (7), (9) and (10), we obtain the following dynamic system: 
1
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  (11) 
The nonlinear and discrete system (11) describes a Cournot triopoly game based on differentiated products 
and heterogeneous players. The dynamics is due to a three-dimensional nonlinear map that depends on five 
parameters.  In the following section, the dynamic stability properties of this model will be discussed. 
3.1. The equilibrium points and local stability 
To study the qualitative behavior of the solutions of the nonlinear model (11), we study the existence of 
equilibrium points  and their stability properties. We find the equilibrium points of system (11) imposing 
1
, .1, 2,3t ti i iq q q i
+ = = =  Then, they are the non-negative solutions of the following nonlinear system: 
( )
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
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 (12) 
It is concluded that the dynamic system (11) has two equilibrium points: 
1 0, ,
2 2
a c a c
E
d d
− − =  + + 
 and 
2 , , ,
2( 1) 2( 1) 2( 1)
a c a c a c
E
d d d
 − − −=  + + + 
 where a > c should hold to ensure nonnegative equilibrium points. The 
equilibrium point  E1 is a boundary equilibrium and E2  is the unique Nash equilibrium point. 
 
8 
The local stability of the equilibrium points of the three-dimensional system (11) depends on the eigenvalues 
of the Jacobian matrix of (11). This matrix is given by:  
1 2 3 1 1
1 2 3
( , , )
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 
  (13)     
Proposition 1. The boundary equilibrium point E1 is unstable (a saddle point). 
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The three eigenvalues are, 
2 2
1 2,3





β β βλ α λ= − ± − +− −+ =
+
. We have 
1 1λ > given 
that 0, 0a cα > − >  and 1 1
2
d− < < . Moreover as 0 1,β< <  it is verified that 2,3 1λ < .   
Next, we discuss the local stability of the Nash equilibrium. The Jacobian matrix (13) evaluated in this 
equilibrium is given by: 
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The eigenvalues of (14) are the solution of its characteristic equation which can be reduced to the cubic 
equation 3 2
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According to the Jury’s criterion (see [17]), the equilibrium point 
2E is locally asymptotically stable if: 
1 2 3 1 2 3
1 2 3 1 2 3
2 2
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 − >+ − − > 
  (15)         
Proposition 2 
The Cournot-Nash equilibrium 2E is locally asymptotically stable provided that: 
2
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2(1 ) 8 (4 )
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C d d
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βα α
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ii) 23 0A− > , because 2 1A < . 
It is deduced: 
2
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βα α
β
 + − + − + − > ⇔ < =
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To solve the inequality 2
2 1 3 31 0A A A A− + − > , we consider the equation  
2
2 1 3 31 0A A A A− + − = , that is a 
quadratic equation in α  with coefficients depending on the rest of parameters. The discriminant of this 
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equation is always nonnegative, then the equation 22 1 3 31 0A A A A− + − =  has two real solutions, 2 3 and α α , 
























Moreover, it is deduced that: 
2
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, comparing the thresholds
1 2 and α α , we obtain that 1 2α α< . 
From these results, we conclude that the threshold of adjustment speed ensuring the local asymptotic stability 
of the Nash equilibrium is given by:  
2
1 2 2
2(1 ) 8 (4 )
( ) 2(4 ) ( 2)(2 )
C d d
a c d d d d
βα α
β
 + − + = =
 − + + − + + 
   
From this proposition, it is deduced that the local stability of the Nash equilibrium strongly depends on the 
adjustment speed of gradient firm.  Particularly, if this firm is excessively reactive (the value of α is high), the 
Nash equilibrium loses the stability and complex dynamics for the whole system may emerge. Therefore, it is 
interesting to analyze the effects of the other parameters on the value of the threshold .Cα We will consider 
the influence of β and d. 
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0
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As we have noted, a value of β equal to 1 would indicate that the adaptive firm applies naïve expectations, 
and then, a high value of this parameter makes the third player more inclined to change quantity with respect 
to the previous period, favoring the presence of instability. 
To evaluate the impact of the degree of product differentiation, we calculate: 
2 3 4 2 2 3 4 2
2
2 2
(8 10 4 ) (32 8 16 8 ) 8(4 2 )
4
( ) 2(4 ) ( 2)(2 )
C d d d d d d d d d
d a c d d d d
α β β
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∂ + + + − − + + + + − −=
∂  − + + − + + 
  (18) 
In the parametric plane4 ( , )d β , the sign of (18) changes in the curve: 
2 4 3 2
2 2
32 8 (4 ) (2 ) 12 76 80 16
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From this result it is deduced that, independent of the behavior of the adaptive player, in the presence of 
complementary goods (d < 0), the Nash equilibrium becomes more stable when goods tend to be more 
 
4 For simplicity, we assume a = 2 and  c = 1. 
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independent, being this result in line with the conclusions obtained in the literature (see [16] for the duopoly 
case, and [6] in a context of a linear dynamic system of a differentiated triopoly). By contrast, this result is not 
reproduced in the presence of substitute goods. Assuming d > 0, the curve (19) represents the locus of points 
(d, β) such that the expression (18) is equal to zero and Cα reaches a maximum value. Thus, for each value of 
β, there is a critical value of substitutability for which, the threshold of adjustment speed of the firm 1 
ensuring the stability of the Nash equilibrium is maximum. This surprising result shows that a higher 
independence between goods does not necessarily imply a higher stability of the Nash equilibrium. 
From an economic point of view, this last result is related with the inter-temporal strategic substitutability of 
quantities in the presence of substitute goods (see [22]) which, in turn, it is influenced by the relationship 
between β and d. Specifically, as β is closer to one, the value of d that maximizes the level of strategic 
substitutability between gradient firm’s quantity and the competitors’ output goes to zero. 
3.2. Numerical simulations 
This section illustrates the obtained analytical results through different simulations of the model (11).  
Moreover, we show different non-equilibrium dynamics generated by the model. 
Being a = 2, c = 1, β = 0.5, d = 0.5, and assuming the parameter α  free, the next figures show that an increase 
in the firm 1's adjustment speed destabilizes the Nash equilibrium leading to increasingly complex attractors. 
The attractor in the Figure 2a is the Nash equilibrium, in Figure 2b a 2-cycle and in Figure 2c we can observe 
complex behavior. Figure 3 shows the strange attractor which attracts the trajectory shown in Figure 2c. 





















 a . α = 2.5 b . α = 2.8 c . α = 3.9 
Fig. 2 . Trajectories of q
1
 for the values of parameters a = 2, c = 1, d = 0.5, β = 0.5, α given in each figure and initial conditions 
0 0 0
1 2 3




Fig. 3 . The strange attractor of (11) for the values of parameters a = 2, c = 1, d = 0.5, β = 0.5, α = 3.9. 
The loss of stability of Nash equilibrium, and the appearance of increasingly complex attractors, when the 
adjustment speed increase, is corroborated in Figure 4. In this figure, it is shown the bifurcation diagram of 
1
q  
with respect to the adjustment of speed, with a = 2, c = 1, d = 0.5 and β = 0.5. We see that the Nash 
equilibrium loses its stability via flip bifurcations, leading to cyclic attractors and strange attractors.  
This result is in line with the conclusions obtained in [1], [26], [16], and [6], among others. 
 
Fig. 4. Bifurcation diagram of q
1




In Figures 5 and 6, we illustrate the effect of the parameter d on the threshold Cα  in the presence of substitute 
goods through simulations (keeping a = 2, c = 1, β = 0.5).  
A higher independence between goods (d tends to zero) may destabilize the Nash equilibrium (see Figure 5a 
versus Figure 2a). On the other hand, there are cases where the Nash equilibrium is more stable when the 
goods are more substitutes (d tends to one) (see Figure 5b versus Figure 2b). This result contrasts with the 
previous conclusions offered by [16] for the duopoly case, and by [6] for the triopoly case in a linear dynamic 
system. 


















 a. 0 0 0
1 2 3
0.1, 2.5, 0.4, 0.4, 0.4d q q qα= = = = =  b. 0 0 0
1 2 3
0.75, 2.8, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2α= = = = =d q q q  
Fig. 5 . Trajectories of q
1
 for the values of parameters a = 2, c = 1, β = 0.5 and d, α and initial conditions given in each figure. 
Figure 6 shows the bifurcation diagram of 
1
q  with respect to d, with a = 2, c = 1, α = 2.5 and β = 0.5. 
 
Fig. 6. Bifurcation diagram of q
1
 with respect to d for the values of parameters a = 2, c = 1, α = 2.5 and β = 0.5. 
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4. Dynamics under Bertrand competition 
In this section, we consider a dynamic triopoly where firms compete on price rather than quantity. In this 
setting, the quantity demanded to each firm is given by expressions (4). 
At each period t, every firm must form an expectation of the rival’s price in the next time period in order to 
determine the corresponding profit-maximizing prices for period t + 1. As in the Cournot case, it is assumed 
that firm 1 is a gradient player, such that, this firm decides to increase or decrease the price in next period, as 
it experiences positive or negative marginal profit. While firm 2 is a naïve player, and firm 3 thinks with 
adaptive expectations. By using (4) and (5), the nonlinear three-dimensional system that describes the game 
dynamics is given by: 
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d a d c d p dp dp
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d d
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 − + + − + + += + − +
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+
  (20) 
4.1 Equilibrium points and local stability 
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0
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− + + − + + + = − +

− + + + + = + 
− + + + +− + = + 
 (21) 
From (21) we obtain two equilibrium points: 
1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
0, ,
2 2
d a d c d a d c
S
d d
− + + − + + =  + + 
and 
2 ,
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
, ,
2 2 2
d a d c d a d c d a d c
S
− + + − + + − + + =  
 
being S1 a boundary equilibrium and S2 the 
unique Nash equilibrium point. 
 
16 
In this case, the Jacobian matrix of the three-dimensional dynamic system (20) adopts the expression: 
1 2 3 1 1
1 2 3
(1 ) ( 1) 4(1 )
1
(1 )(2 1) (1 )(2 1) (1 )(2 1)
( , , ) 0
2(1 ) 2(1 )
1
2( 1) 2( 1)
a d d c d p dp dp dp dp
d d d d d d
d d






 − + + − + + ++ − + − + − + 
 
=  + + 
 
− + + 
 (22) 
 
Proposition 3. The boundary equilibrium point S1 is unstable (a saddle point). 
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d− < < . Moreover as 0 1,β< <  it is verified that 2,3 1λ < .  
The Jacobian matrix (22) evaluated in the Nash equilibrium S2  is given by: 
2
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(1 )(1 2 ) (1 )(1 2 ) (1 )(1 2 )
(1 ) (1 )
( ) 0 ,  with *
2(1 ) 2(1 ) 2
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d p dp dp
d d d d d d







 +− − + − + − + 
  − + += = + + 
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− + + 
  (23) 
The eigenvalues of (23) are the solution of its characteristic equation which can be reduced to the cubic 
equation 3 2
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1 *
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+ + + −
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Proposition 4 
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a d c d d d d d d d
βα α
β
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0, 0, 1,0 1
2
a c dα β−> > > < < < < , the following holds: 
i) 
( )2
1 2 3 2
3 2 *
1 0.








23 0B− > , because 2 1B < . 
The other two conditions define the threshold of the firm 1's adjustment speed for the local asymptotic 
stability of the Nash equilibrium. 
[ ]
2 2
1 2 3 1 2 2
2(1 )(1 2 ) 8(1 ) (4 8 5 )
1 0
(1 ) (1 ) (2 3 )(2 3 2 ) 2(1 )(4 8 5 )
d d d d d
B B B
a d c d d d d d d d
βα α
β
 − + − + + + + − + − > ⇔ < =
 − + + + + + − + + + 
 
The equation  22 1 3 31 0B B B B− + − =  has two real solutions, 2 3 and α α , such that 3 0α <  and the sign of 2α in 
parametric plane5 ( , )d β  is shown in Figure 7.  
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1 2 and α α  in light region in Figure 7, we obtain that 1 2α α< .  
From these results, we conclude that the threshold of adjustment speed ensuring the local asymptotic stability 
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As in the quantity competition case, it is deduced that the local stability of the Nash equilibrium is determined 
by the adjustment speed of gradient player, given that an increase in the parameter α  constitutes a source of 
complexity. 
We deduce the effect of d and β on the threshold of the adjustment speed.   
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Therefore, as in the Cournot case, the greater the value of β, the lower the stability of the Nash equilibrium is, 
regardless of the value of the parameters a, c and d. 





is more complicated. From computational calculus, we obtain that in 
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Zoom of Fig. 8. 
 
Therefore, the conclusions obtained under Cournot competition are reproduced when firms compete on price. 
In the presence of complement goods, a reduction in the degree of complementarity (d tends to zero), 
increases the stability of the Nash equilibrium. By contrast, this monotonous relationship is not reproduced 
assuming substitute goods. In this case, an increase in the degree of product differentiation may both stabilize 
 
6 Again, for simplicity, we assume a = 2 and c = 1. 
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and destabilize the Nash equilibrium, given that there is a degree of substitutability (being fixed β) for which 
the threshold of the adjustment speed is maximum (note that this result holds for positive values of d close to 
zero). In this case, this last result is related with the inter-temporal strategic complementarity of prices in the 
presence of substitute goods (see [22]). 
4.2. Numerical simulations 
As in the Cournot competition, we obtain that an increase in the adjustment speed of firm 1 destabilizes the 
Nash equilibrium leading to increasingly complex attractors. Figure 9 shows the bifurcation diagram of 
1
p  
with respect to the adjustment speed, with a = 2, c = 1, β = 0.5, d = 0.5. We see that the Nash equilibrium loses 
its stability via flip bifurcations, leading to cyclic attractors and strange attractors. 
 
Fig. 9. Bifurcation diagram of p
1
 with respect to α for the values of parameters a = 2, c = 1, d = 0.5 and β = 0.5. 
From comparison of thresholds  and α αC B , we conclude that the value of the adjustment speed where the 
Nash equilibrium loses its stability is lower under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition for 




β−> > < < < <a c d . This conclusion is shown in Figure 10, and it is in 
accordance with the results obtained in [6]. From the economic perspective, this result can be understood as 
the consequences on the stability of a fiercer competition under Bertrand competition than under Cournot 




Fig. 10. Comparison between thresholds  and α αC B  for the values of parameters a = 2, c = 1. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we study the dynamics in a triopoly game with product differentiation, and heterogeneous firms. 
By investigating the local stability of the equilibrium points, under both quantity and price competition, we 
find the following results. 
First, under both quantity and price competition, the behavior of the gradient firm may constitute a source of 
instability. This happens whenever this player is sufficiently reactive, presenting a high value of the 
adjustment speed. This result corroborates the conclusions offered in the literature (see [26], [15], [16], and 
[6], among others). 
Second, the firm of adaptive expectations has a stabilizing or destabilizing effect on the game, given that if 
this firm is more inclined to change quantity or price with respect to the previous period, the Nash equilibrium 
can lose the local stability. This result is in line with the conclusions offered by [26], and [15] in absence of 
product differentiation. 
Third, we discuss the effect of the degree of product differentiation on the local stability of the Nash 
equilibrium. We find that under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, in the presence of complement 
goods, a greater independence among goods increases the stability of the Nash equilibrium, reproducing   the 
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previous results proposed in the literature (see [16] for the duopoly case, and [6], for a differentiated triopoly 
with linear dynamic system). However, assuming substitute goods, a monotonous relationship between 
degree of product differentiation and stability is not reproduced. Regardless of the competition type, there is a 
critical degree of substitutability for which the set of values of the adjustment speed for the gradient firm that 
ensures the local stability is largest. In consequence, a decrease of the degree of product differentiation may 
destabilize the Nash equilibrium. 
Finally, the comparison between Cournot and Bertrand competition allows us to deduce that the Nash 
equilibrium is more stable in a quantity setting context, independently of the nature of the products (in line 
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